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TEXT OF STATUTE 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-104 (1953 as amended) 
CONSENSUAL ALTERCATION NO DEFENSE TO 
HOMICIDE OR ASSAULT IF DEADLY WEAPON USED. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under part 2 of 
this chapter or assault, it shall be no defense to the prosecution 
that the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, or other 
consensual altercation, if during the course of the duel, combat, or 
altercation, any deadly weapon was used. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaint if f -Respondent, 
v. 
JEFF NELSON, 
De fe ndant-Appe1lant. 
Case No. 880416-CA 
Priority #2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Jeff Nelson for 
one count of Battery, a Class B misdemeanor. A jury found Mr. 
Nelson guilty of one count each of Battery and Destruction of 
Property at the conclusion of a one-day trial on April 27, 1988. On 
that same date, Mr. Nelson was sentenced to serve 180 days in the 
Salt Lake County jail on each count, sentences to run concurrently 
with each other and concurrent with the time Mr. Nelson was then 
serving in the Utah State Prison, provided restitution was made 
within one year after his release from the prison. This sentence 
was imposed in the Third Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, by the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans, judge. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of November 5, 1987, Jeff Nelson was present 
in the apartment of Melissa Fonnesbeck at 1123 East 900 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah (T. 32). Until about a week before, the two had 
lived together for ten months, sharing an apartment in Bountiful, 
Utah (T. 28, 29). 
Soon a f t e r Mr. Ne l son ' s a r r i v a l a t Ms. Fonnesbeck 's on 
November 5 th , Shawn C a r l i s l e , a person be l ieved by Appel lant to be 
Ms. Fonnesbeck's new boyf r iend , knocked on the door . 
There i s no c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence in the record up to t h i s 
p o i n t ; however, the f a c t s regard ing the remainder of the i n c i d e n t 
are d i s p u t e d . 
Mr. Nelson t e s t i f i e d t h a t he argued with Mr. C a r l i s l e a t 
the door and outs ide Ms. Fonnesbeck 's apartment and t h a t Mr. 
C a r l i s l e l e f t the area (T. 121) . Mr. Nelson fu r the r s t a t e d t h a t Ms. 
Fonnesbeck a l so came outs ide and began y e l l i n g a t him while s t and ing 
in the r a in c lad only in a robe (T. 122) . He t r i e d to get her to 
go back ins ide and she re fused , so he picked her up over h i s 
shoulder and c a r r i e d her in while she s t r u g g l e d , k ick ing and h i t t i n g 
him on h i s back (T. 122) . 
Back i n s i d e , the argument con t inued . In the course of 
t h i n g s , Mr. Nelson slapped Ms. Fonnesbeck, rebreak ing her nose , 
which had been broken e a r l i e r t h a t summer in a car acc iden t (T. 
123, 3 9 ) . 
The ve r s ion of the f a c t s r epor ted by Ms. Fonnesbeck and Mr. 
C a r l i s l e on behalf of the Ci ty from the time of Mr. C a r l i s l e ' s 
a r r i v a l a t the apartment d ive rges from the account given by Mr. 
Nelson. 
Mr. C a r l i s l e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was met a t the door by Mr. 
Nelson, who then b u r s t out pushing and y e l l i n g a t Mr. C a r l i s l e , 
u t t e r i n g t h r e a t s and warning him to s t ay away from Ms. Fonnesbeck 
(T. 16, 1 9 ) . 
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Ms. Fonnesbeck testified that she opened the door a little 
bit and that Mr. Nelson ran up the stairs to the door and hit Mr. 
Carlisle and chased him down the driveway shouting threats (T. 
33). She also stated that after the confrontation between Mr. 
Nelson and Mr. Carlisle, Mr. Nelson returned to the apartment and 
began throwing things around (T. 33). As this was happening, she 
ran outside and down the driveway in order to get the upstairs 
neighbor to call the police. She stated that Mr. Nelson then came 
out, ran down the driveway, grabbed her by the hair, and dragged her 
the length of the driveway back to the apartment, down the stairs 
through the apartment and to the bedroom (T. 34). Mr. Nelson then 
allegedly turned off the light, pinned Ms. Fonnesbeck on the bed, 
and choked and hit her (T. 35). Ms. Fonnesbeck testified that she 
was then dragged to the bathroom. At that point the police came to 
the door to investigate the situation (T. 37). Jeff Nelson was 
charged by information on March 18, 1988 with Battery and 
Destruction of Property. (See Addendum A). 
Salt Lake City Police officer Craig Young testified that he 
reported to a call on November 5th, 1987 at Ms. Fonnesbeck's address 
and that there was a continuing argument in his presence between 
Jeff Nelson and Melissa Fonnesbeck. Officer Young testified that 
Ms. Fonnesbeck was bleeding from her nose (T. 77, 78). Officer 
Young also stated that it was his impression that both Mr. Nelson 
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and Ms. Fonnesbeck had engaged in the altercation (T. 81, 82, 86), 
and that the typical family fight involves both the male and the 
female (T. 83 ) . 
After the presentation of evidence by the defense, the 
court met with respective counsel in chambers to discuss jury 
instructions. Defendant, through counsel, requested the inclusion 
of an instruction which stated that mutual combat or consensual 
altercation could be considered as a defense to the battery charge. 
(See Addendum B) . 
The court rejected this proposed instruction, stating that 
there was no evidence to support it. Defendant reserved the 
objection at the court's request and placed it on the record at the 
conclusion of the jury's deliberations (T. 148, 149). Because the 
court found that there was no basis in the evidence for an 
instruction of this type, discussion of the correct wording of such 
an instruction was foreclosed. 
The jury convicted Jeff Nelson of Battery and Destruction 
of Property, both Class B misdemeanors. On the same date, April 27, 
1988, the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans, Judge in the Third Circuit 
Court, imposed sentence on Mr. Nelson. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant urges this Court to overturn his conviction of 
the Battery charge. Appellant contends that the trial court erred 
reversibly in not allowing the inclusion of a jury instruction 
supportive of Defendant's theory of the case when such theory had 
basis in the evidence presented at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JEFF NELSON'S CONVICTION OF BATTERY SHOULD 
BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN REJECTING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO HAVE 
THE JURY INSTRUCTED ON HIS THEORY OF THE 
CASE WHERE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED WHICH 
SUPPORTED THIS THEORY, 
Jeff Nelson was convicted on April 27, 1988, of the crimes 
of Battery and Destruction of Property. Mr. Nelson contends that 
the trial court erred reversibly in rejecting his proposed jury 
instruction setting forth his defense. The Court refused to give 
this requested instruction on the grounds that there was no factual 
basis for it. This error was prejudicial and requires reversal of 
the Battery conviction on appeal. 
Mr. Nelson prepared and submitted to the trial court 
proposed jury instructions. Inter alia, Mr. Nelson requested the 
inclusion of an instruction regarding mutual combat or consensual 
altercation as a defense to prosecution for Battery. This proposed 
instruction set forth the law as follows: 
If the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Jeff Nelson was a party to any duel, mutual combat, 
or other consensual altercation, then you must find 
the defendant not guilty. (See Addendum B) . 
Before the trial court instructed the jury, the court and 
respective counsel discussed proposed instructions in chambers and 
off the record. The court refused to give this instruction, stating 
there was no evidentiary basis other than the statement of Defendant 
-5 -
which would support such a theory. Defense counsel reserved an 
objection on the record at the conclusion of the trial after the 
verdict was rendered (T. 149). The court noted the objection but 
gave no reason on the record of its reasons for rejecting the 
requested instruction. The court erred reversibly in not submitting 
Defendant's proposed instruction on mutual combat. The instruction 
was unchallenged by either the prosecution or the court as a proper 
statement of the law. Contrary to the court's assertion, the 
instruction was supported by the evidence given at the trial. The 
impact of the court's refusal to instruct was indisputably 
prejudicial. 
The legitimacy of the defense instruction on mutual combat 
as an instruction was unchallenged at trial by either prosecution or 
the court. The language of the instruction is taken from Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-104 (1953 as amended), which states that duel, mutual 
combat or other consensual altercation may not be used as a defense 
to prosecution for homicide or assault if during the course of the 
duel, combat, or altercation any deadly weapon was used. This 
statute does not prohibit the raising of mutual combat or consensual 
aggression as a defense generally, but only when the party 
attempting to raise it used a weapon. It logically follows that 
when no weapon is used, mutual combat or other consensual aggression 
are defenses to battery. This defense is commonly raised. Its 
legitimacy, not having been raised at trial, is not at issue here. 
The two questions before this Court are whether the mutual 
altercation instruction had a factual basis in the case at bar and 
whether the trial court's refusal to give the instruction 
constitutes reversible error. 
The Utah Supreme Court has in numerous cases stated that 
each party in a criminal case i s e n t i t l e d to have the jury 
instructed on the law applicable to i t s theory of the case if there 
i s any reasonable basis in the evidence to jus t i fy i t . In S t a te v. 
C a s t i l l o , 457 P.2d 618 (Utah 1969), the t r i a l cou r t ' s refusal to 
give defendant 's requested self defense ins t ruc t ions was upheld. 
Defendant admitted at t r i a l to enter ing his former wife 's dwelling 
armed with a knife in an t ic ipa t ion of t rouble , although his sole 
ground for apprehension was his observation of a s t ick under a couch 
on a previous occasion. The court held that defendant did not 
present subs tant ia l evidence to support his theory of the case. The 
court s tated the guidelines as follows: 
If the defendant 's evidence, although in 
material conf l ic t with the S t a t e ' s proof, be such 
that the jury may en t e r t a in a reasonable doubt as 
to whether or not he acted in se l f -defense , he i s 
e n t i t l e d to have the jury instructed fully and 
c lear ly on the law of se l f -defense . Conversely, 
if a l l reasonable men must conclude that the 
evidence i s so s l igh t as to be incapable of 
ra i s ing a reasonable doubt in the j u ry ' s mind as 
to whether a defendant accused of a crime acted 
in se l f -defense, tendered ins t ruc t ions thereon 
are properly refused. C a s t i l l o , at 620. 
The Utah Supreme Court has elucidated the standard for 
determining whether proposed defense theory of the case jury 
ins t ruc t ions should be given in other cases. In State v. Torres, 
619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980), the court reversed appe l l an t ' s conviction 
of aggravated a s sau l t . The facts of the case from the S t a t e ' s 
standpoint were es tabl ished primarily through the testimony of a 
Salt Lake City police of f ice r . He t e s t i f i e d that he broke up a 
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f igh t , then gave chase to one of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . He t e s t i f i e d 
that t h i s individual (the accused) challenged him, kicked him, threw 
him to the ground and struck him with a n igh t s t i ck . The accused 
t e s t i f i e d that when he attempted to surrender, the officer struck 
him with a n igh t s t i ck . He pushed the officer down, then grabbed the 
n ights t ick and struck him when the officer went for his gun. 
The Torres decision i s i l luminating in the matter at hand. 
In Torres, as in Mr. Nelson's case, the primary evidence of the 
defense theory of the case was t e s t i f i e d to by the defendant. 
Officer Young's testimony was somewhat corroborative of Mr. Nelson's 
statements as to the mutuality of the a l t e r c a t i o n ; in the Torres 
case, defendant 's version of the facts was completely 
uncorroborated. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that the 
t r i a l court acted properly in giving an ins t ruc t ion on the theory of 
self defense based soley on the testimony of the accused. 
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction in Torres because 
the t r i a l court erred in refusing to give defendant 's requested jury 
ins t ruc t ion s t a t ing that the defendant did not have the burden of 
persuasion in re la t ion to t h i s theory of self defense. The Court 
explained: 
We are not concerned with the 
reasonableness, nor the c r e d i b i l i t y of the 
defendant 's evidence re la t ing to his claim 
of self defense. Each party i s , however, 
e n t i t l e d to have the jury ins t ructed on the 
law applicable to i t s theory of the case if 
there i s any reasonable basis in the 
evidence to jus t i fy i t . Torres at 695. 
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In State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to instruct on 
self defense was proper • In Brown, the defendant was found guilty 
of killing his victim for the purpose of preventing him from 
testifying. In his defense defendant raised the theories of 
intoxication and self defense. The Court held that although 
defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of 
the crime if there is any basis in evidence to support it, in this 
case it could not find any credible evidence that the defendant was 
justified in using deadly force or any reasonable belief that he was 
in danger. Consequently the instructions were properly refused. 
The facts in Brown are distinguishable from the facts in 
the case at bar. In Brown, there was no testimony offered by 
defendant or anyone else to show that his victim ever assumed the 
role of aggressor. Brown, at 255, 256. In Mr. Nelson's case, on 
the contrary, there are facts in evidence supporting defendant's 
theory of the case. 
Based on the holdings in these cases, it is clear that a 
defendant's requested theory of the case instruction must be given 
by the court when it has a factual basis. See also State v. Potter, 
627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981) and State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 
1985). 
Applying this standard to the facts in the case at bar 
reveals the court's error in failing to give defendant's mutual 
altercation instruction. Mr. Nelson himself testified that Ms. 
Fonnesbeck was kicking and hitting him on the back (T 122, 131). 
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Also, Mr. Nelson gave testimony that Ms. Fonnesbeck attempted to 
prevent him from taking his property from her apartment and that 
there was further struggling (T. 123). His testimony was 
corroborated to a certain extent by officer Young, who testified 
that upon his arrival, both Mr. Nelson and Ms. Fonnesbeck were 
engaged in an argument (T. 78). He also stated that it was his 
impression that both had been involved in the disagreement (T. 81), 
and that Ms. Fonnesbeck had been a participant in the fight 
(T. 82, 83). 
The testimony of Ms. Fonnesbeck contradicts that of Mr. 
Nelson and officer Young on these particulars. However, the accused 
was entitled to an instruction on his theory as much as the city was 
on its theory where the facts were in dispute. The court usurped 
the function of the jury in weighing and discounting the evidence of 
Mr. Nelson's defense. The jury was pre-empted from evaluating the 
evidence in light of applicable law and reaching their own 
conclusions. 
The court committed reversible error in declining to give 
Mr. Nelson's requested instruction regarding mutual combat. Error 
is prejudicial and requires reversal on appeal "unless it can be 
said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted 
even in the absence of error at the trial level." State v. Chappie , 
660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983). In assessing whether error is 
reversible the crucial question is not whether there is substantial 
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evidence to support the judgment, but whether the error affected the 
judgment, United States v. Robinson, 544 P.2d 611 (2nd Cir. 1976). 
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme 
Court stressed that a court may reverse a conviction when the error 
at trial is such that: 
there exists a reasonable probability or 
liklihood that there would have been a 
result more favorable to the defendant in 
absence of the error. J^d at 1352. 
In the case at bar, there is a reasonable probability or 
liklihood that the result would have been more favorable to the 
defendant had the jury been instructed on the mutual combat theory. 
The court's refusal to instruct the jury was clearly reversible. 
There is certainly a reasonable likelihood that the result of the 
jury's deliberations as to the battery charge would have been more 
favorable to Mr. Nelson had the court allowed them to consider his 
defense. There is a reasonable liklihood that the jury would have 
acquitted Mr. Nelson of battery had they been instructed on, and had 
the defense been permitted to argue, the mutual altercation defense. 
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on 
the mutual combat/consensual altercation defense. Appellant 
contends that this error mandates reversal by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds discussed above, Appellant seeks reversal of 
his conviction for Battery and remand of his case to the Circuit 
Court with an order for dismissal of the charge or for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ j day of September, 1988. 
l ^ ^ ^ ^ r M j?4 yCA/WVvA^ 
DAVID P.S. MACK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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